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Abstract 
In an open railway access market, the provisions of railway infrastructures and train services are 
separated and independent.  Negotiations between the track owner and train service providers 
are thus required for the allocation of the track capacity and the formulation of the services 
timetables, in which each party, i.e. a stakeholder, exhibits intelligence from the previous 
negotiation experience to obtain the favourable terms and conditions for the track access.  In 
order to analyse the realistic interacting behaviour among the stakeholders in the open railway 
access market schedule negotiations, intelligent learning capability should be included in the 
behaviour modelling.  This paper presents a reinforcement learning approach on modelling the 
intelligent negotiation behaviour.  The effectiveness of incorporating learning capability in the 
stakeholder negotiation behaviour is then demonstrated through simulation.  
 
Keywords 
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transportation system 
 
1. Introduction 
 
For two centuries, railways have been the backbones for public transportation and pivotal to 
urban development.  Because of the substantial capital costs on the infrastructure, the railway 
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service provision may easily become natural monopoly.  As a result, the train services are 
generally non-competitive and they require heavy regulations (ECMT, 2001; Cantos & Campos, 
2005).  In order to introduce competition and improve efficiency, the railway industries in many 
countries have undergone substantial reform in the last two decades.  The market structure has 
been revamped with the introduction of open railway access market (ABTRE, 2003).  
Independent service providers are allowed to enter the railway market to create competition in an 
attempt to improve service quality. An open railway access market usually consists of an 
Infrastructure Provider (IP) and a group of Train Service Providers (TSPs).  The IP is 
responsible for providing infrastructure resources, negotiating prices and selling track capacity to 
the TSPs. The TSPs operate train services and hence they are required to negotiate with the IP to 
obtain the rights of track access.  As the track recourses are limited, TSPs may compete among 
themselves for the track access. 
This new reform poses a new challenge to the railway management.  In the traditional 
railway services market, the infrastructure and train service provisions are managed by a single 
company which has the overall and integrated responsibility for devising train service timetables 
while satisfying various operational objectives.  The trade-off between objectives is relatively 
easy to achieve.  For example, the railway operator is able to adjust with flexibility the number 
of train services to balance between cost recovery (i.e. revenue intake) and traffic demand (i.e. 
maintaining the services of low or even no profit).  However, in the new market environment, 
the stakeholders are distributed and self-interested individuals and they have different business 
goals (Pietrantonio & Pelkmans, 2004).  Their objectives are likely in conflict.  A TSP may 
pull out from train service provisions which are low in profit despite public demand while the IP 
is keen on maximising the infrastructure utilisation for the interest of the public.  Therefore, 
repetitive negotiations and concessions among the stakeholders to ensure reasonable service 
provision are required.  Allocating the resource efficiently becomes a demanding job for the IP 
as the behaviour of the stakeholders during negotiation is difficult to predict. 
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In the analysis of the quality of service provision in an open railway market, the traditional 
post-operation evaluation techniques, such as statistical analysis and case studies, are not 
particularly useful as the stakeholder behaviour model, which is unique in a given market 
configuration, is not included.  Moreover, the traditional techniques do not allow the study on 
the performance of different possible market configurations since the cost or risk of 
experimenting with those parameters in a real market is too high.  The above issues are indeed 
the limitations in the traditional methods for the purpose of analysing stakeholder behaviour. 
With the new open market and complicated negotiation processes among the stakeholders, it 
is necessary to evaluate the resulting resource allocation and timetables, and the quality of 
services and infrastructure capacity utilisation.  Simulation is regarded as the most conceivable 
approach to address the above problems because it provides the systematic ways to evaluate and 
analyse the behaviour of different stakeholders.  The change of the stakeholder behaviour and 
under different market configurations can be studied by adjusted the behaviour models flexibly.   
However, the traditional simulation modelling techniques, such as rule-based approaches, 
recursive and iterative algorithms, are not adequate to model the interactive market environment 
and self-interested stakeholder behaviour as they are too complicated to be pre-defined and 
approximated.  In a previous study, a multi-agent system is employed for the open railway 
access market (Tsang, 2006; Tsang & Ho, 2007; Tsang & Ho, 2008).  Multi-agent system is a 
powerful tool to represent the behaviour and interactions of the stakeholders which are 
distributed in nature (Shen et al., 2006).  The complex and interactive behaviour among 
stakeholders has been demonstrated even when only a simple model of the individual 
stakeholder behaviour is adopted.  However, the stakeholder behaviour modelling in this study 
is not yet adequate as the agents lack the learning capability that their human counterparts 
possess.  Introducing learning capability allows agents to demonstrate goal-oriented behaviour 
and enhance the problem-solving ability.  In this study, the learning capability is incorporated in 
the stakeholder model through reinforcement learning. 
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Reinforcement learning techniques focus on discovering the optimal actions in a specific 
environment so that the long-term reward is maximised.  They enable an agent (or a learner) to 
learn the optimal policy that maps directly from environment states to actions and to achieve the 
goal of the agent (Kaelbling et al., 1996).  Reinforcement learning allows more realistic 
simulation studies on the stakeholder interactions and their negotiations in an open railway 
access market. 
This paper demonstrates the application of reinforcement learning techniques to enhance 
stakeholder behaviour modelling for negotiation simulation in open railway access market.  
Section 2 describes the reinforcement learning framework in an open market.  Section 3 gives 
the negotiation models for IP and TSP.  Section 4 introduces the reinforcement learning 
algorithm adopted and Section 5 presents the simulation results of the case studies. Conclusions 
are then made in Section 6. 
 
2. Reinforcement learning framework 
 
It has been shown that the Multi-Agent System (MAS) approach is suitable for modelling the 
independent, self-interested and autonomous features of the stakeholders in an open railway 
access market (Tsang, 2007).  MAS manifests the complex interactions among independent 
entities and their behaviour by modelling the individuals as agents.  However, this simple agent 
model adopted is very much on a rule-based approach and hence not sufficient to demonstrate 
the more complex negotiation behaviour that occurs in real-life situations as it lacks the 
intelligence for learning and bargaining.  For example, the strategies for the IP to determine the 
charge for track access; and for the TSP to set service proposal, are pre-defined prior to the 
negotiation, but they should have been revised intelligently according to the experiences from 
the previous rounds of negotiations.  In order to facilitate a more realistic behaviour model, 
intelligent learning should be incorporated in the agent modelling so that the stakeholder agents 
  5
in an open railway access market are able to select the most suitable strategies among the 
available options from their own experiences. 
Although game theory is one of the possible approaches to model and govern the agent's 
negotiation behaviour (Binmore & Vulkan, 1997), it is not applicable in this study because the 
complete game model (i.e. payoff and penalty of each strategy) is not available.  The agent 
should learn the reward or penalty of each strategy before solving the game. 
Machine learning is one of the topical areas of artificial intelligence, which allows computers 
to learn.  Supervised learning, unsupervised learning and reinforcement learning are the three 
common types of machine learning.  With supervised learning, a function is generated to map 
input objects to desired outputs from a set of training data (Zhao & Liu, 2007).  A typical 
application of supervised learning is classification, in which the input objects are classified into 
different categories according to specific criteria.  Unsupervised learning focuses on capturing 
the inherent data organisation structures (Zhao & Liu, 2007).  Clustering is an example of 
unsupervised learning problems, in which a hierarchical structure is sorted and established with a 
given set of unlabelled data. Reinforcement learning enables the process of learning a policy on 
taking an action in an environment in order to maximise the long-term reward (Sutton & Barto, 
1998) and it has been applied in multi-agent systems as a learning algorithm (Crites & Barto, 
1998; Suematsu & Hayashi, 2002; Oo et al., 2002).  Reinforcement learning algorithms have 
been successfully deployed in various decision-making processes, such as setting prices in a 
competitive marketplace (Tesauro & Kephart, 2002). 
The basic reinforcement learning consists of three main components.  They are environment 
states, action sets and reward (or value) functions.  An advantage of reinforcement learning is 
that pre-defined training sets are not required (Ribeiro, 1999).  The learning is achieved through 
real-time interactions with the environment.  At each interaction with the environment, a learner 
first perceives the environment states and the available actions and then selects an action which 
is based on the current action-taking policy, the environment states and the value functions.  
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Subsequently, the learner revises the action-taking policy and the value functions by the 
observed new environment states and the immediate reward.  Having experienced these 
interactions, the learner is able to learn the action-taking policy that leads to higher long-term 
reward according to the pre-defined value function. 
During stakeholder negotiation in an open railway market, pre-defined actions and reward 
data sets for training are usually unavailable.  The stakeholder can only gain knowledge and 
experience of achieving goals through the interactions with other stakeholders in the 
environment of open railway access market.  The learning objective focuses on selecting 
suitable action rather than clustering different actions to different objectives.  Therefore, 
reinforcement learning is the most promising learning algorithm for stakeholder negotiation 
modelling in an open railway access market.  In this study, reinforcement learning is introduced 
as the learning algorithm to the stakeholder negotiation behaviour model. 
The reinforcement learning approach is integrated into the negotiation behaviour model by 
mapping stakeholders and their behaviour to the reinforcement learning framework, in which the 
individual stakeholders are the learners.  The stakeholders should be able to learn and choose 
the suitable action or strategy which satisfies their own objectives.  The environment states 
consist of the parameters that are to be changed by the decisions the stakeholders make.  The 
action sets describe the negotiation strategies available, such as price adjustment.  Reward 
function indicates how well the stakeholder objectives are achieved.  
For example, the IP determines which pricing strategies or actions (increasing, decreasing or 
keeping the prices) should be applied during the negotiation with different TSPs such that the 
overall revenue intake can be further improved.  The decision-making variables include the 
degree of pricing level that a train service is currently charged, and the features of the train 
services that are favourable to the TSP.  The reward function records the revenue improvement 
resulting from applying pricing strategies under certain conditions.  Upon completing the 
learning, the IP is equipped with the best pricing strategy with respect to the reward function.  
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Fig. 1 shows the proposed intelligent stakeholder negotiation behaviour models. 
Maximising profit is likely to be the common objective of IP and TSP.  This paper will 
present a negotiation problem that is intended solely on maximising the profit for both IP and 
TSP.  In practice, IP and TSP may carry multiple and different objectives. 
 
3.  Open market negotiation models 
 
During each negotiation between IP and TSPs to allocate the track capacity and generating 
train services timetables in an open railway markets, the IP and one of the TSPs attempt to reach 
a deal on the track access right which specifies the conditions and costs for track usage.  The 
negotiation is an iterative process in which the two stakeholders take turns to express their 
requirements or restrictions on the track usage.  Since certain terms or conditions of the 
timetable requested by a stakeholder are not likely to be favourable to another, the negotiation 
inevitably contains a sequence of bargaining and/or concession made by both parties. The 
negotiation is completed until a mutually acceptable agreement is reached, or one of parties 
withdraws from the process.  This section discusses the negotiation models, procedures and 
criteria of reaching a train service timetable. 
 
3.1 Track access rights 
The track access rights consists of four components, a track access charge (TAC) that TSP has 
agreed to pay; the type of rolling stock to be operated on tracks; a parameter called flex level to 
denote the right for IP to revise the train schedule when track and station capacity become scarce 
(Gibson et al., 2002); and a time schedule specifying the details of the train service.  A track 
access rights R is defined below, where c is the track access charge, ω is the type of rolling stock, 
Φ is the flex level and Ψ is the train schedule. 
 R = < c, ω, Φ, Ψ >               (1) 
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The train schedule Ψ is a set of stations, S, describing the sequence of the train stations the 
train service goes through.  The service commencement time, dwell time at each station and 
inter-station runtimes between stations are given by ζ, DT  and RT respectively.  
Ψ= < S, ζ, DT , RT >              (2) 
 
3.2 Negotiation procedures 
One approach to classify negotiations is by the number of parties involved (Luo, 2003).  The 
negotiation is regarded as bilateral when there are only two participating parties.  A simple case 
is that a single IP negotiates with a TSP (i.e. IP-TSP negotiation).  When more than one TSPs 
are involved, the negotiation becomes multilateral (i.e. IP-nTSP negotiation).  
The negotiation is initialised by the IP who requests all TSPs to submit services bids of their 
preferred train schedules.  After collecting all the bids, the IP derives a feasible service 
timetable by taking into consideration of all constraints imposed by the TSPs (i.e. combinatorial 
timetable generation) or negotiating with the TSPs one by one according to a specific sequence 
and then deriving the train schedules (i.e. sequential timetable generation). 
Sequential negotiation is further classified into transaction-based and round-based.  In 
transaction-based negotiation, the IP proposes offers to other TSP’s only after completing the 
negotiation and conflict-resolving process with the current TSP (i.e. upon completion of a 
transaction).  On the other hand, with round-based negotiation, the IP temporarily adjourns the 
negotiation with the current TSP and proposes an offer to another TSP immediately if there is a 
conflict between the current TSP’s proposed schedule and those committed by the IP so far.  
The IP then determines another negotiation sequence and starts negotiations with the other TSPs 
again.  The optimisation problem in combinatorial timetable generation clearly requires higher 
computation demand since the problem scale is substantially larger. Sequential timetable 
generation is however a more practical approach since it only considers one IP-TSP transaction 
(i.e. a bilateral negotiation) at a time.  Furthermore, the transaction-based negotiation only 
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requires one negotiation-sequence and it is thus adopted in this study.  The negotiation 
sequence can be derived from simple rules, such as first-come, first-served (Tsang, 2007), or 
intelligent ranking of the service bids from the TSPs (Ho, et al., 2009). 
With the negotiation sequence, the IP evaluates the bid content and proposes a train service 
schedule to each TSP; or requests the TSP to revise the bid specification if necessary.  In bid 
revision, the TSP first determines the possibility of revising the bid and then re-submits a bid to 
IP if a revision is possible.  Otherwise, the TSP withdraws from negotiation.  An IP-TSP 
transaction is only completed if TSP satisfies with the train service schedule or withdraws from 
negotiation.  Upon the completion of the IP-TSP transaction, IP starts a new negotiation process 
and negotiates with the next TSP in the sequence.  This IP-nTSP negotiation continues until all 
the IP-TSP transactions are completed.  The procedures of an IP-nTSP transaction are 
illustrated in Fig. 2. 
 
3.3 Acceptance criteria 
In this study, the objective of the IP and TSPs is to maximise profit.  The following 
timetable acceptance criteria are adopted to satisfy this objective. 
 
3.3.1 IP 
IP collects revenue by selling the track capacity to the TSPs.  The revenue intake is 
determined by the track access charge (TAC).  The profit is thus the difference between the 
TAC and the expenses on setting up the train services.  In general, the cost for the IP to run an 
additional service (i.e. marginal cost) is complex and it depends on a number of factors, such as 
energy consumption, maintenance and traffic demands.  The marginal cost is derived from the 
sub-charges on track usage, traction energy, peak power demand and traffic congestion (Tsang, 
2007).  IP accepts a train service timetable only if the TAC is higher than the marginal cost and 
the timetable is free from conflict. 
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3.3.2 TSP 
The revenue intake of TSP is determined by the service charges and service usage.  The 
demand of the TSP train services depends on several factors, such as service quality, price 
elasticity, seasons and market share.  A simple model has been established to calculate the 
revenue intake of the TSP (Tsang, 2007), in which the TSP is assumed to operate the passenger 
services only and the revenue intake is determined directly by the passenger traffic demand. 
The daily passenger traffic demand is required to determine the usage of train services. 
Several factors, such as population, employment, trip rates, ticket costs and transportation time, 
are considered.  A simple daily passenger traffic demand model D is adopted here.   
                                )()( tfCtD d                                (3) 
f(t) describes the variation of traffic demand in one day.  dC  is set to 1 if the TSP operates a 
train service which satisfies the requirements of the passengers, such as reasonable ticket prices 
and expected commuting times, or dC  is set to 0.  dC  thus imposes an additional constraint 
on the TSP’s train service provision.  In real-life operations, there are several more accurate but 
complex models to determine the passenger demand (Chen, 2007; Li et al., 2002; Thamizh et al., 
1997).  This simple model is adequate to allow demonstration of the proposed negotiation 
behaviour model.  The revenue intake )(tR  of the TSP is then obtained by multiplying the 
ticket cost TC  to the passenger traffic demand. 
                                 )()( tDCtR T                               (4) 
A TSP is willing to operate train services only if the services are profitable, which implies 
that the TSP is satisfied with the train service timetable. In other words, the degree of satisfaction 
is measured by the deviation of the original TSP’s proposed train schedule from IP’s proposed 
schedule.  The TSP is willing to pay higher TAC if the IP can provide the TSP’s preferred 
service timetable.  Two decision thresholds, TSP_AC (HS) and TSP_AC (LS), are introduced 
to indicate the TSP’s maximum acceptable TAC, corresponding to the highest and lowest 
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satisfaction levels of the schedule.  The actual value of TSP acceptance cost (TSP_AC) is 
determined from the timetable satisfaction level of the train schedule which has been proposed 
by the IP.  The TSP accepts the track access right only if the proposed TAC is lower than the 
TSP acceptance cost.  Fig. 3 shows a typical example of revenue intake and TSP acceptance 
cost over a period of starting time of the train service. 
 
4.  Reinforcement learning framework 
 
Reinforcement learning in a multi-agent system provides agents with the intelligence 
capabilities to transform the experience of interacting with other agents to the knowledge of 
achieving their goals. The reinforcement learning mechanism can be regarded as a generalised 
policy iteration (GPI) (Sutton & Barto, 1998), which includes two processes, policy evaluation 
and policy improvement; and they are interleaved. In the policy evaluation process, the value 
function is reviewed and updated according to the environment states, the selected action and the 
observed reward. This process enables learning the reward of selecting an action in a given 
environment state. The policy improvement process is to summarise the knowledge of the value 
function and to learn the greedy policy (i.e. the policy which always takes the action with the 
highest short-term reward). Reinforcement learning has found numerous successful applications 
over various areas in recent years (Ernst, 2004; Wang & Usher, 2005; Jiang & Sheng, 2009; 
Gomez-Perez et al., 2009) 
 
4.1 Computational algorithm 
4.1.1 Q-Learning 
Q-Learning is a computational algorithm to solve reinforcement learning problem (Watkins, 
1989).  One of the advantages of Q-Learning is that no actual environment models are required.  
An agent learns the optimal action by determining the optimal action-value function (Q-function).  
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The Q-function is the expected return of a given state and action under certain policy π: 
                  
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where sS, and s is environment state of the finite environment set S; aA and A is the action 
set, r is the reward and γ is the discount factor of future rewards. 
The simplest form of one-step Q-Learning is defined by (6).  The Q-function is updated by 
the immediate reward r, the selected action a, the greedy Q-value in the next state )','( asQ , the 
discount factor γ and the learning rate α.  
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4.1.2 Exploration vs exploitation 
One important issue in reinforcement learning is the balance between exploration and 
exploitation.  Adequate exploration action helps the agent to discover the alternative 
non-greedy actions which yields better result over time.  In this study, the soft-max selection 
function (Buşoniu et al., 2008) is applied to ensure sufficient exploring actions.  
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The soft-max selection provides a simple method to balance the exploration and exploitation 
actions by allowing the highest action selection probability for the highest Q-value action while 
keeping lower Q-value actions with lower probability.  ),( asP  denotes the probability of 
selecting action a in state s.  The positive parameter τ is the temperature which controls the 
randomness of exploration.  High temperature leads to more arbitrary action selections and 
hence higher exploration rate.  Low temperature results in a wider variation in action selection 
probability so that the higher-valued actions are more likely to be selected.  When the 
temperature is zero, the function output is equivalent to the greedy action selection. 
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4.1.3 Q-Planning 
Q-Planning is one of the methodologies for an agent to predict how the environment responds 
to its actions by modelling the environment (Sutton & Barto, 1998).  Given a certain state and 
policy, the model generates a simulated experience which contains the information of the 
observed state; and the reward which is used to update the value function and policy.  The 
learning can be hastened by providing more such simulated experience. 
 
4.2 Reinforcement learning model for open railway market 
4.2.1 IP model 
Environment Set: The strategy for the IP to maximise profit is that the IP’s offered TAC 
should be the same as the TSP’s maximum acceptable TAC which is highly dependent on the 
business goal of individual TSP and its proposed train service timetable.  Therefore, the 
environment set should include the factors to evaluate the TSP’s maximum acceptable TAC.  
The proposed train service start-time is a suitable candidate for determining the maximum TAC 
as it is based on the proposed TSP traffic demand and revenue.  The environment set should 
also include the price charging levels (i.e. the offered TAC) of different train services.  A 
simple definition of the charging level is based on the IP’s marginal cost (MC). 
     Charging Level %100*
TAC
MCTAC 
         (8) 
In this study, the environment set of the IP is determined by the combination of individual 
charging levels and defined as IPS :( 1c , … , ic , … , nc ) , where ic  is the charging level for the 
ith TSP and n is the total number of TSPs.  The value of ic  is given by if ( timestartt  ){0, 1, 
2, … , maxc }, where maxc  is the maximum charging level which is set as 2*MC.  if ( timestartt  ) 
is a function of the ith TSP’s proposed train service time and timestartt  {0, 1, 2, … , maxt }.  maxt  
denotes the last possible service start-time permissible in the timetable.  For example, 
IPS :( 1f (0) = 0, 2f (3) = 2 , 3f (5) =1) means the IP is charging the three TSPs 1, 2 and 3 at 
levels “0”, “2” and “1” respectively.  The proposed train service start-times of the TSPs 1, 2 
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and 3 are “0”, “3” and “5”.  The charging levels and train service start-times are set as follows. 
Charging level “0” = the price is set at marginal cost. 
Charging level “1” = the price is set at marginal cost +5%. 
Charging level “2” = the price is set at marginal cost +10%; and so on. 
Train service start-time “0” = service start-time set at the earliest start-time. 
Train service start-time “1” = service start-time set at the earliest start-time +5 mins. 
Train service start-time “2” = service start-time set at the earliest start-time +10 mins; and so on. 
Action Set: The action set A of the IP to be taken on the ith TSP is defined by (9), where inA is 
increasing the charging level by one step, unA  is keeping the charging level unchanged and deA  
is decreasing the charging level by one step. 
A:( inA , unA )           for ic =0                                          (9) 
A:( unA , deA )           for ic = maxc  
A:( inA , unA , deA )         otherwise 
For example, the initial charging levels on the services proposed by TSPs 1, 2 and 3 are “0”, 
“2” and “1” respectively, i.e. IPS :(0, 2, 1).  If the IP is taking action inA  to the TSP-1, unA  to 
the TSP-2 and deA  to the TSP-3, the charging levels of TSPs 1, 2 and 3 become 1, 2 and 0 and 
the state of IP is IPS :(1, 2, 0). 
Reward Function: The objective of this learning process is to set suitable TAC in order to 
maximise the profit in the negotiation with the TSP.  IP’s profit is the difference between the 
TAC and the marginal cost required to provide the track access of the agreed service.  The 
reward function indicates the possible improvement in profit when the learning process goes 
through the environment states of the IP.  The IP should propose a reasonable TAC, or it loses 
the goodwill in further negotiation with the TSP.  A penalty factor p = max(0, TAC–TSP_AC) 
is introduced in the reward function to ensure proper negotiation behaviour. 
r = Profit (observed state) - Profit (previous state) - p                  (10) 
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4.2.2 TSP model 
Environment Set: In order to maximise profit, TSP should actively respond to traffic demand.  
From the traffic demand model derived in the previous section, a TSP should set up a train 
service at the peak hours to maximise the revenue intake.  Therefore, the train service start-time 
should be included in the environment set.  The environment set of the ith TSP is determined by 
the service start-time and defined as TSPiS {0, 1 …, maxt }, where maxt  is last possible service 
start-time permissible in the timetable.  When 1TSPS =3, TSP-1 is proposing a train service 
schedule to IP, in which the service start-time is “3”.  The train service start-times are 
interpreted as follows: 
Train service start-time “0” = service start-time set at the earliest time. 
Train service start-time “1” = service start-time set at the earliest time +5 mins. 
Train service start-time “2” = service start-time set at the earliest time +10 min, and so on. 
It should be noted that the notations of train service start-times in the environment sets of IP 
and TSP can be different.  Individual agents in a MAS are allowed to have their own models. 
Action Set: The action set A of the ith TSP is defined below, where deT  is delaying the service 
start-time by one step, unT  is keeping the service start-time unchanged and adT  is advancing 
the service start-time by one step. 
A:( deT , unT )        for iS = 0           (11) 
A:( unT , adT )        for iS = maxt  
A:( deT , unT , adT )       otherwise 
For example, if TSP-1 initially sets up a train service with start-time “3”, i.e. 1TSPS =3, and 
subsequently it adjusts the service start-time by taking action deT , the service start-time of TSP-1 
becomes “4” and hence it is in the state 1TSPS =4. 
Reward Function: The objective of this learning process is to set suitable service start-time to 
maximise the profit in the negotiation with the IP.  TSP’s profit the difference between its 
income, as derived by (4), and the TAC paid for the agreed service.  The reward function r 
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depicts the possible improvement on profit when the learning process is taken through the 
environment states of the TSP. 
r = Profit (observed state) - Profit (previous state)            (12) 
 
5. Simulation results and discussions 
 
A Multi-Agent System for Open Railway Access Markets (MAS-ORAM) developed in a 
previous study is adopted here to facilitate the stakeholder negotiations and to evaluate the agent 
behaviour (Tsang, 2007).  MAS-ORAM is implemented through the platform of JADE (Java 
Agent Development Framework) which allows easy realisation of fully FIPA-compliant 
multi-agent systems (Bellifemine et al., 2003).  MAS-ORAM acts as a platform for the agents 
to interact and negotiate with others for resource allocation and price setting; and also to 
demonstrate the intellectual capabilities of the agent induced by reinforcement learning. 
A hypothetical open railway access market has been set up to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
reinforcement learning.  This market consists of one IP and five TSPs while the railway 
services cover five stations (A, B, C, D and E).  The details of the TSPs and the inter-station 
distances are given in Tables 1 and 2.  The earliest start-time (i.e. train service start-time 
interval ID=“0”) is 06:00 and each time-step is a 5-min interval.  Hence, the initial environment 
states of the TSPs are 1TSPS =1 (6:05), 2TSPS =3 (6:15), 3TSPS =7 (6:35), 4TSPS =9 (6:45) and 
5TSPS =5 (6:25). 
In this study, three learning scenarios have been implemented to demonstrate how 
reinforcement learning enhances the stakeholders’ intellectual capabilities.  They are individual 
IP learning only; TSP learning only; and both IP and TSP learning.  In each scenario, there are 
two phases, training and testing phases.  In the training phase, the stakeholder negotiates and 
interacts with others to acquire the knowledge for achieving their objectives.  A substantial 
number of training rounds are given before performance evaluation is conducted (i.e. testing 
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phase).  The actual number of training rounds required is determined by observing the agent 
behaviour or the greedy action policy (i.e. the policy which always takes the action with the 
highest short-term reward).  The training phase is completed if the greedy policy is unchanged 
after 15 consecutive rounds and 90% of the environment states have been visited.  In each 
training round, the IP agent negotiates with 5 TSP agents and generates a complete train service 
schedule (completing one round of IP-nTSP negotiation).  Upon the commencement of each 
new training round, the IP agent negotiates with 5 TSP agents again with the preserved 
knowledge and state values (i.e. the value functions, state values and action-taking policy are 
identical to those at the end of the previous round).  However, the state values are arbitrarily 
reset after completing a fixed number of training rounds (say, 40 training rounds).  It is to allow 
the agents to explore more environment states and actions. 
In the testing phase, there are no arbitrary state values resetting and the agents always take the 
greedy action.  Before conducting the testing phase, the environment states of the agents are 
reset to the initial values (i.e. IPS  =(0, 0, 0, 0, 0); and 1TSPS =1, 2TSPS =3, 3TSPS =7, 4TSPS =9 
and 5TSPS =5) while the value functions and action-taking policies remain.  At the end of the 
testing phase, the learning is deemed effective if the agent is able to take the appropriate actions 
and achieve its objective of maximising profit. 
 
5.1 IP learning 
The reinforcement learning is applied to IP only.  280 training rounds are completed in the 
training phase.  Table 4 summaries the IP’s revenue intake upon the agreed services with the 
TSPs at the end of the testing phase, the calculated marginal cost of the services and hence the 
profit.  Having possessed no knowledge on TSPs initially, the IP is able to set TACs which are 
close to the TSPs maximum acceptance cost so that its own profit is maximised in the agreed 
services.  As further illustrated in Fig. 4, the revenue intake and the profit attained by the IP are 
improved through the testing rounds as it gradually learns to take the suitable actions to 
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maximise its profit.  
 
5.2 Individual TSP learning 
240 training rounds are taken in the training phase for the individual TSP learning, in which 
reinforcement learning is given to TSP-1 only.  To highlight the effect of learning, the service 
retained by TSP-1 and hence the corresponding revenue intake with and without learning are 
compared in Table 4. TSP-1, equipped with knowledge from learning, improves its revenue from 
$4,800 to $5,400 by changing the service start-time at the end of the testing phase.  Fig. 6 
illustrates the TSP-1’s revenue and profit through the testing rounds and it is evident that TSP-1 
takes appropriate actions swiftly and settles on a better profit in the testing phase.  
 
5.3 IP and TSP learning 
Learning is adopted by both IP and TSPs here and 680 training rounds are taken.  Table 5 
summarises the IP’s estimated TAC limits of the TSPs at the end of the testing phase.  Figs. 6 - 
10 show the IP’s performance on the negotiation with each of the 5 TSPs, including its marginal 
cost (MC), profit and estimated acceptance cost of the TSP over the possible the range of service 
start-times.  The highest TSP acceptance cost limits, i.e. TSP_AC(HS) are also given for 
comparison.  In general, the IP is able to set TAC close to the TSP_AC limit.  The cases where 
the IP’s estimated TSP acceptance cost is not close to the TSP limit are mostly on service 
start-times with lower revenue intake.  The corresponding states are thus less attractive with 
lower reward values and hence they are visited less frequently during the learning process.  
Therefore, the IP does not have the sufficient experience to determine the maximum schedule 
cost at these service start-times.  On the other hand, when these service start-times do not give 
high revenue intake, they usually favour neither IP nor TSP in their pursuit of maximum profit.  
As a result, it is not necessary for the IP to give good estimate of the TSP’s acceptance cost over 
such service start-times. 
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 For the performance of the TSPs upon learning, the service start-times proposed by the TSPs 
in the testing phase (represented by Time Interval ID) are given in Fig. 11 while Figs. 12 and 13 
show the revenue intakes and profits of TSPs in the testing phase.  Table 6 summarises revenue 
intakes of the TSPs on the agreed services at the end of the testing phase. 
The TSPs are able to identify the states leading to the maximum revenue and to revise the 
service start-times accordingly, which is reflected by their increasing profit and changes of 
service-start-times during the testing phase.  From Table 6, it is interesting to note that TSP-3 
settles on the service start-time interval ID “9” rather than the time interval ID “7” which gives a 
higher revenue intake.  It is due to the fact that the IP TAC setting at the time interval ID “9” is 
substantially lower than that at “7”.  As a result, TSP-3 can make more profit by operating the 
service at time interval ID “9” than that at “7”.  This example depicts the interactive behaviour 
of the IP and TSPs during negotiation as they look for the possible improvement of the reward 
through the experience of interaction.  As a whole, the simulation results suggest that the 
reinforcement learning significantly helps both IP and TSPs to maximise profit. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The application of reinforcement learning in intelligent behaviour modelling on the 
stakeholders for the open access market train-service schedule negotiation is presented.  The 
reinforcement learning models for the stakeholders as a learning mechanism in the realistic 
negotiation behaviour have been discussed.  A simple railway open market with stakeholders 
equipped with reinforcement learning capability is set up and the simulation results suggest that 
the learning algorithm enhances the problem-solving abilities of the stakeholders with respect to 
achieving their goals.  They have gained the experience and learnt how to take the most suitable 
actions to achieve the goals through interactions in the environment.  The IP is able to 
determine the suitable track access charge and hence maximise the profit while the TSPs 
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improve the profit by adjusting the train service start-time. 
This study provides the platform for further development on stakeholder behaviour modelling 
to facilitate more realistic simulation of the railway open markets.  The TSPs compete with 
others through negotiations with the IP in order to optimise their own objectives.  However, in a 
railway market, cooperation among TSPs to attain a mutually favourable train service is possible.  
Through cooperation, a TSP is able to eliminate or reduce the conflicts with other TSP's 
proposed train schedules by negotiating with them directly.  Therefore, those proposed train 
schedules are more likely to be accepted by the IP because of better track utilisation (from the IP 
perspective).  As a result, the TSPs benefit from the cooperation as their objectives are fulfilled.  
This cooperative negotiation behaviour can also be achieved by the introduction of 
reinforcement learning.  For example, the environment states of a TSP include the identity of 
the collaborators and their credit records. The TSP then accepts or rejects the schedule 
adjustment request according to the credit record and the margin of schedule adjustment.  A 
positive reward is obtained if other TSPs also demonstrate the cooperative behaviour or vice 
versa.  Through the interactions with others, the TSP learns to determine the most suitable 
strategy in the cooperative negotiations (i.e. accepting or rejecting the schedule adjustment 
request) and the corresponding concessions.  
While this study does not apply the game theory techniques to the schedule negotiation, game 
theory can be integrated in the reinforcement learning framework.  It is possible to employ 
reinforcement learning techniques to explore actions and obtain the action rewards in an 
interactive environment, and to adopt game theory techniques to solve the negotiation (game).  
In other words, reinforcement learning techniques extend the applicability of game theory in the 
negotiation behaviour modelling. 
In addition, the reinforcement learning knowledge has been stored and represented in tabular 
format in this study.  This representation is not the most efficient as the reuse of the knowledge 
is not particularly flexible.  Further studies on the improvement of knowledge management are 
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necessary for more realistic behaviour models. 
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Figures 
 
Fig. 1. Intelligent stakeholder negotiation behaviour model for an open railway access market 
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Fig. 2. Negotiation procedures between IP and TSPs 
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Fig. 3. An example of revenue intake and the highest and lowest acceptance cost of a TSP 
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Fig. 4. Revenue intake and profit attained by the IP in the testing phase 
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Fig. 5. Revenue intake and profit attained by TSP-1 in the testing phase 
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Fig. 6. Estimated TSP-1 acceptance cost, marginal cost, profit and TSP-1_AC (HS) 
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Fig. 7. Estimated TSP-2 acceptance cost, marginal cost, profit and TSP-2_AC (HS) 
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Fig. 8 Estimated TSP-3 acceptance cost, marginal cost, profit and TSP-3_AC (HS) 
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Fig. 9. Estimated TSP-4 acceptance cost, marginal cost, profit and TSP-4_AC (HS) 
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Fig. 10. Estimated TSP-5 acceptance cost, marginal cost, profit and TSP-5_AC (HS) 
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Fig. 11. TSP proposed service start-time in the testing phase 
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Fig. 12. Revenue intake of TSPs in the testing phase 
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Fig. 13. Profit of TSPs in the testing phase 
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Tables 
Table 1 Initial TSP proposed train schedules and their maximum acceptance cost 
ID TSP-1 TSP-2 TSP-3 TSP-4 TSP-5 
ζ (hh:mm) 06:05 06:15 06:35 06:45 06:25 
DT (min) {1,1,1,1,1} {1,1,1,1,1} {1,1,1,1,1} {5,0,0,0,3} {13,12,0,13,16}
RT (min) {16,24,14,15} {16,24,14,15} {16,24,14,15} {11,16,9,11} {24,34,23,23} 
TSP_AC($) 1920 1920 2240 1960 1680 
 
 
Table 2 Distances between the stations 
Origin station Destination station Inter-station station (km)
A B 20 
B C 30 
C D 15 
D E 20 
 
 
Table 3 Collected revenue intake and the final cost upon TSP acceptance 
 Testing phase results 
 TSP-1 TSP-2 TSP-3 TSP-4 TSP-5 
Collected Revenue (TAC) 1920 1826 2220 1924 1680 
Marginal Cost (IP Expense) 1362 1305 1306 1568 1379 
Profit 558 521 914 356 301 
 
 
Table 4 Agreed service and revenue intake attained by TSP-1 
Initial service start-time 6:05 
Initial time interval ID 1 
Initial revenue intake 4800 
 With Learning Without Learning 
Agreed service start-time 6:15 6:05 
Agreed time interval ID 3 1 
Revenue intake 5400 4800 
Agreed TAC  1384 1384 
Profit 4016 3416 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  30
Table 5 IP performance during IP-TSP learning 
 
TSP Proposed Service 
Start-Time ID 
TSP_AC (HS) 
IP Estimated 
Max. TSP_AC 
TSP-1 3 2160 2159 
TSP-2 5 2200 2199 
TSP-3 9 2040 1939 
TSP-4 12 2480 2469 
TSP-5 10 1960 1892 
 
 
Table 6 
 
Time Interval ID 
with Max. 
Revenue Intake  
Revenue 
Intake 
Time Interval ID 
of Agreed 
Services  
Revenue 
Intake 
Profit 
TSP-1 3 5400 3 5400 3255 
TSP-2 5 5500 5 5500 3347 
TSP-3 7 5600 9 5100 3468 
TSP-4 12 6200 12 6200 3744 
TSP-5 10 4900 10 4900 3088 
 
